Presuppositions in religion and the realism debate.

The well-known teasing question, “Do you still beat your wife” presupposes the truth of at least two suppositions (i.e. implies their truth for different semantic reasons): that the respondent has a wife, and that he has beaten her. If this is not the case, the respondent can answer neither in the affirmative nor in the negative without admitting what is presupposed. Instead, he has to answer e.g., “In fact, I have never beaten my wife”.

This popular example comes under H. P. Grice’s considerations about communication in his article “Logic and conversation”. One of Grice’s results is that the successful communication comprises exactly what is necessary to communicate the message aimed at.

However, there is one particular, overriding, condition which every statement presupposes viz. that the statement has semantic meaning, especially that the singular words have word meaning. Next, it presupposes that the interlocutor can accept the contained concepts. The similar of course applies to questions, mutatis mutandis.

It must also be observed that when a sentence can be declared semantically meaningless, it does not qualify to be disproved, neither empirically nor rationally. For it has no semantic content.

Among the examples of sign sequences that may have semantic meaning but which some do not want to accept for specific reasons, can be the Danish term “starthjælp” (“start help”) or metaphorical use of the term “arbiter of taste”. Their reason may be that the former is used as a kind of new speech about reduced social benefits and the latter about persons who have studied a field.

It must be observed that to explain what something, i.e. some X or other, is, it is insufficient just to say “X is something that has these and these qualities” or “X is that which is so and so”, unless the defining relative clause refers to the concept that should be the starting point of the definition. However, this would make the sentence unnecessarily clumsy. (It would e.g. be clumsy to say, “A table is something that is a piece of furniture that...”) Instead, we must use the schema “X is a Y that has these and these qualities”. We could e.g. say “A table is a piece of furniture that...” or “A table is a physical object that...” Thus, we can only define something by means of already clarified concepts.

Religion.

A sad example of this is made by the question “Do you believe in God?” which presupposes that it consists of words, especially that the sign sequences “believe” and “God” are words. The section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs” in Treatise No 5 it makes good that this is not the case at all, but that these sign sequences only borrow an appearance of semantic meaning form usages in which they in fact have semantic meaning and thus are words. Therefore, we can answer this question neither in the affirmative nor in the negative without accepting that the two mentioned sign sequences “believe” and “God” have semantic meaning. Likewise, the concepts theist, agnostic and atheist all presuppose too much, if we for instance define a theist as a person that asserts, “I believe in God”. Thus, we cannot either answer the question “Are you an atheist?” without accepting the religious persons’ putative concepts. Instead, we can only say that the atheists have not understood the religious persons’ error, and explain this as it has been done in the treatise referred to above.

From the arguments above in can be concluded that when A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic advances a stringent rational proof against the existence of a putative God, this is superflouos. For there is neither something to prove nor disprove. Certainly, Ayer also concludes that the theists are not sufficiently critical. However, his reasons are that they accept statements such as ‘There is no transcendent god’, which are “nonsensical”, because they are metaphysical and thus neither true nor false. Thus, it must be observed that when Ayer says that “the term ’God’” is a metaphysical term, he erroneously attributes a semantic meaning to the sign sequence “God”. However, as above-mentioned, even this lacking word meaning makes the religious sentences semantically meaningless.

The realism debate.

In his treatise Reality Lost and Found” Søren Harnow Klausen asserts: “Since antirealism is the denial of realism, the definition of this term becomes absolutely crucial”. ([Klausen 04] p. 13)

However, the premiss about anti-realism presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the concepts that enter into this definition, which does not have to be the case at all. It is just as wrong to assert that anti-realism is the opposite of realism as it is to assert that atheism is the opposite of theism – for similar reasons. SHK presents the following definition of realism:

“Realism about the external world is the view that the world exists...”, and that its basic qualities are independent of how they are experienced and understood by conscious beings. ([Klausen 04] p. 13-14)

However, SHK does not thematize what it means to say that the world exists. Instead, SHK copies what he wants to negate into his definition of anti-realism, which is exactly what one cannot do if one wants to do full justice to the realism debate:

“Anti-realism is any denial of – or refusal to subscribe to - the view that the word exits...” with the same additions as referred above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)

However, the anti-realist does not at all need to deny that the world exists, or that the attributes of the world depend of how it is experienced. For of course an anti-realist can think that reality exists but just have a different interpretation of the statement “Reality exists” than the realist has, so far as the latter has an interpretation. Thus, the anti-realist may think that the realism debate is about the semantic meaning of this statement, including what it means that things exist and have the qualities they have.

It is also expressive of a simplified idea of the substance of the realism debate if the expression “the denial” is supposed to denote the directly contrary viewpoint. For then it presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the realist’s view of the problem as being about existence versus not-existence. If, however, the expression is just to denote some contradiction it becomes too loose and not a definition of anti-realism, but just some view or other that accepts the realist’s way of presenting the problem.

For safety’s sake, Klausen amplifies his mistake with this statement:

“Realism is of course the belief in the existence of reality”. ([Klausen 04] p. 14, my bold types.)

However, as already made clear, the realism debate does not deal with existence versus not-existence, but with the semantic meaning of our existence statements. And it does not at all deal with any forms of belief or suppositions, but with arguments. This naturally turns the attention to the fact that SHK’s lacking understanding of this is already suggested by the title of SHK’s book Reality Lost and Found, which suggests that reality does not exist according to the one part of the realism debate, but exist according to the other part.

SHK defines reality and the world in the following remarkable way: ‘And reality is simply “the world” as defined above”: that which exists independently of its being experienced...’ with the most of the additions above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)

What is remarkable in this quotation is its use of the following concept:

“that which exists independently of its being experienced...”.

This definition reminds incredibly much of past definitions of some entity X called “God”, e.g. that which is the greatest”. Both definitions presuppose that it has been clarified what kind of “that” we are dealing with.

Firstly, the definition circularly presupposes that it has sense to discuss the subject in this way, which is exactly what the realism is about and which some anti-realists want to argue against. Secondly, it presupposes that the opponent can accept it. As it has been concluded, definitions demand clarified concepts. Klausen’s erroneous approach has been touched on in the section “The semantic approach the realism debate” in Treatise No 4.

Litteratur:

Treatises No 1-7: http://philosophical-debate.blogspot.dk/ eller http://sites.google.com/site/antiintroduktionisme.

A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).

H. P. Grice: “Logic and Conversation”, i Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Robert M. Harnish (ed.), (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994).

Søren Harnow Klausen: Reality Lost and Found, University Press of Southern Denmark, (Denmark 2004).

An ethical basis.

Is there a basis of ethics and politics, i.e. one or more objectively substantiated statements about how it is best to act?

The question has already been clarified in Treatise No 6, which also advances some examples of the consequences for politics.

The discussion started from the point of view Alfred Ayer states in Language, Truth and Logic ([Ayer 74], pp. 136-150), that the only thing we can argue for concerning moral is the facts that sustain our moral conclusions given a particular moral attitude, whereas we cannot argue for the very moral attitude concerned. ([Ayer 74], p. 147) As far as I can see, Ayer oddly enough does not substantiate his own view.

As the next best solution, we can alternatively imagine that a basis follows from a particular statement, which it would be unreasonable not to accept. However, luckily we do not have to leave it at that.

As regards the necessary basis, we can make the following considerations.

The principle of argumentation.

After the fashion of Aristotle’s principle of contradiction, we can talk of a “principle of argumentation”. The principle is rather evident and sounds:

It is necessary to argue for one’s statements in order that they can be standpoints.

It is possible to choose not to discuss one’s standpoints. Those who have that attitude can just insistently assert, “I chose to think whatever that suits me to think”. However in that case and in the nature of the case, we only have to do with an unfounded standpoint. This is at most a sociological problem, not a philosophical one.

We can argue against this standpoint, in so far as it can be called a standpoint, that an unfounded standpoint is just arbitrary, and that it follows from the standpoint that any standpoint can be just as good or bad as any other, and that the standpoint leads to a situation in which arbitrary standpoints are faced with each other. However, this is of no use towards to the person who advances it. We can only convince the holder by getting him argue for his standpoint. (For then, the standpoint is not just a choice, but a standpoint the holder thinks is right.) Cf. [Aristoteles 1968] 1006a.

This argument can be compared to Aristotle’s argumentation for the principle of contradiction: that we cannot argue against the person who denies it, because it presupposes what is to be proved. We can only convince him by getting him follow the principle.

The derivation of a basis of ethics.

Instead, if a person at all wants to discuss the question whether there is a basis of an ethic and politics, he must admit that there is such a basis, and even which basis it proves to be. This has the following reason:

If we want to discuss the question and search for an answer to it, we must concentrate on it and seek to clarify all the circumstances that can illuminate it. This demands favourable life conditions for those who will endeavour to make the necessary investigations and considerations. With this, we have succeeded in finding the basis of an ethics and a politics: the consideration for and a demand for good life conditions for everybody. This has concrete implications concerning how the society ought to be in order to fulfil this demand, and concerning how we ought to act.

Of course, each person’s individual situation and surroundings ought to be involved in his evaluation of his acts. Thus, the individual must concentrate on a number of different circumstances. For ethical questions must be decided on the basis of an understanding of the case itself, and what it involves. This means that any kind of command ethics must be rejected. (Of course, this has nothing to do with traffic rules or the like.)

It can be objected to this argument that it is very far-fetched to argue that there are objective arguments concerning how we ought to act and to arrange society, arguments that are based on the conditions for the very discussion of whether there is an objective ethical basis.

To this, it can be answered that all investigations and clarifications demand good conditions of life. This applies for instance to the existential question of whether life has meaning. It applies to philosophy, linguistics, and all education, both to receive it and to give it. However, this is just an example of an appealing argument for the existence of a basis of ethics.

The question is whether this argument is sufficient to point out a basis of ethics. It would of course be fine if it were so, so it is not to belittle this argument that the following must be considered. However, we must be quite sure. For this reason, the two answers must be compared:

If we presuppose that a question of existential character is to be answered, this certainly involves that the question must be investigated into and that this demands good life conditions. However, there exists no necessary demand that the question must be answered. Thus, the moral basis does not follow with necessity, but only as a side issue of this precondition.

However, if we presuppose that we have to answer the very question whether there is a basis of ethics, then it is a necessary demand that the question of the basis of an ethics must be answered, just because it is put forward. Therefore, the moral basis follows of necessity.

The answer is neither farfetched nor technical as it is a part of one’s ethical considerations to consider whether the ethic is based on a necessary basis, and thus whether one’s acts and chosen politics are based on a necessary basis. Above it has been made good that willingness to clarifying existential questions has ethical implications, however the willingness to this is not in itself necessary. Contrary to this, ethical investigations also involves existential investigations, these have certainly ethical consequences, however they already follows of the willingness to make the ethical investigations.

How broad this basis is, i.e. which types of acts it has clear implications, however, is not immediately clear.

Consequences.

From this basis, it follows that acts that reduce other persons’ living conditions are objectionable. With that, it is objectionable if the laws of a country force the citizens in certain social groups to use all their energy on managing a hand-to-mouth existence, so that they get no means to clarification and experience, i.e. means to live the life and to know it.

In Treatise No 6 further consequences are stated. A few of these are mentioned here:

Any striving towards superfluous products can of course only take place at the expense of other persons’ possibilities of obtaining a reasonable basis of a good life, i.e. their good life conditions. Thus, this striving is objectionable, or rather, not in accordance with the above conclusion. Of course, the same applies to inveigling other people into the same striving.

Superfluous production, and exhaustion of the soil are likewise objectionable as its spoils the basis of our existence, clarification and understanding. The decisive point is here, that though most persons may assert that this is obvious, it is also necessarily true according to the arguments above. Moreover, superfluous production takes up a substantial part of our time for clarification and other forms of experience. The same criticism can be levelled against the very interest in superfluous products.

Some will advance that everyone has the right to dispose of himself and of what he produces and earn. However, above it has been substantiated that this must not be done at the expense of other persons’ possibility of having good life conditions. It must be sufficient to have enough to manage one’s own living conditions and possibilities of development.

It must be observed that we cannot sell out of this basis, understood such that reducing persons’ favourable life conditions can be justified with the argument that they will benefit from this later in some future fiction. We live here and now and need good life conditions here and now. All what we do must always be related not only to the consideration of all persons good life conditions, but also to the reason to this consideration.

Literature.

[Aristotle 68] Aristotle: The Metaphysics, English translation by High Tredennick, Harvard Univ. Press, William Heinemann Ltd. (Great Britain 1968).

[Ayer 74] A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic Penguin Books Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).

Treatise No 6: https://antiintroductionism.wordpress.com/2015/09/24/21/
eller http://sites.google.com/site/antiintroduktionism.