In the movie Seconds, directed by John Frankenheimer, a world-weary businessman gets an offer that seems to be a chance of getting a new life and a new identity: He receives a telephone call from a friend he thought was dead. The friend tells him that instead he has got a new and happy life, and he gives the businessman an address to which the businessman finds his way. From this he is led to The Company, which persuades and not least threatens him to get a new body and life. The business man is an amateur painter, and the idea is that he shall be a professional artist in his new life. The very idea seems unbelievable or “fishy”. Indeed, it also proves to be so, for the artist is led to a place where there are only other new lives (apart from assistants or guards from the company). Can the businessman really have become a professional artist, or shall all of them just tacitly pretend to believe each other?
Certainly only one of the messages of the movie lies hidden here. However, it made me think that we can imagine the possibility of subject areas that in themselves were excellent but in which people would be able to do well, effortless and successful; and unless they instead want to find an interesting and important part of the subject area, this would lead to an unauthentic life. Here people would be able to create an image of themselves and get approval without yielding anything especially demanding. By and large they would be able to have a work that looks impressive, but which did not demand new thinking. As to profundity it would only be an appearance.
The members of such circles could give each other recognition without the recipients having promoted science, even though this ought to be a prerequisite. In former times, influential groups in society could be criticized for keeping their knowledge for themselves... However, in these circles, the members conversely protect themselves against insight, which they of course may not be conscious about, if they are not able to understand it. On the contrary, they can have a number of idiosyncrasies and be engaged in persistently protecting their ideas against what these reactions are directed against. These protecting reactions in form of article and treatises are regarded as meritorious among their associates, also if there in fact should be evident arguments against them because they contain basic argumentation errors.
We can imagine that other persons in this world are satisfied with the first ideas they find and like and that for that reason they find just what they like. Some may even admit that they think that the case can easily be about that. These persons do not exactly meet criticism from their associates either, but accept.
In this society such persons would live an unauthentic life just as the transferred members of the above-mentioned society in Seconds. The same naturally applies to members of religious communities. Their statements have only meaning inside a closed system, just as in role-playing or ludo.
The opposite of this consists in maintaining results even though one does not like them oneself... This is the scientific attitude.
The remarkable thing is that despite of the fact that persons in this imagined world would hardly be satisfied with their life and achievement, apparently persons in the real world are comfortable with a similar unauthentic life.
Tuesday, 16 October 2012
Thursday, 4 October 2012
Ignosticism and semantic meaning.
The article “Presuppositions in religion and the
realism debate” inter alia called attention to the error of defining atheism as
the opposite of theism. Certainly the
following broader definition of atheism can be stated: “Being an atheist is the
same as not being a theist”. ([Skepticisme], my translation.) According
to the homepage [Skepticisme],
atheism is the absence of belief in gods. However, this definition demands some
goodwill, because not all who do not want to call themselves atheists can
accept it; and they have good reasons not to do that. For it is possible to
argue that religious sentences are semantically senseless, as e.g. sign
sequences as “god” and “belief”, when used in religious contexts, lack word
meaning, and as the definition of theism is based on such sign sequences. Persons
that have understood this can neither be called theists nor atheists. For it is
possible neither to deny nor to affirm a semantically senseless sentence, but
only to assert and make good that it is semantically senseless. Some may call
this view agnosticism, but firstly, this term does not have semantic meaning
either. Secondly, it must be observed that if we assert that a particular sentence
is semantically senseless, we assert a stronger statement than when we say that
it is true and when we say that that it is false, simply because it does not
even qualify itself for being true or false. Cf. the section “Semantic critique
of religious sequences of signs” in Treatise
No 5 in which it is argued that religious sentences lack word meaning and
therefore are semantically senseless.
Ignosticism.
Obviously, the standpoint ignosticism or igtheism
is in agreement with these considerations; however, it is too unclear as it
also suggests a certain acceptance.
According to wiktionary.org, the etymology of the
word “ignosticism” is:
ig-
(from ignorant)
+ gnostic
+ -ism. Coined by Rabbi Sherwin Wine. ([Etymology])
Here I will only consider the definition of
ignosticism, the way it is worded in the British version of Wikipedia, and some
of the resuming remarks in the article.
Wikipedia states two definitions of ignosticism.
According to the first, ignosticism is:
“The view that a coherent definition
of God
must be presented before the question of the existence of God can be
meaningfully discussed.” ([Ignosticism])
As far as it goes, this corresponds to what has
been put forward in the above mentioned section “Semantic critique of religious
sequences of signs”, but only after a necessary correction. For in order not to
be semantically erroneous, it ought to be worded in this way:
“The view that a coherent definition
of the term “God” must be presented before the statement
“God exists” can be meaningfully discussed.” ([Ignosticism], my underlinings
of the corrections.)
In the just referred section from [Treatise no
5], however, it has also been argued that such a semantic meaning cannot be established,
as a number of possibilities of this were gone through and criticized.
The referred lexicon article also states:
‘A simplified maxim on the subject states “An
atheist would say, 'I don't believe God exists'; an agnostic would say, 'I
don't know whether or not God exists'; and an ignostic would say, 'I don't know
what you mean when you say, "God exists”’.” ([Ignosticism])
To this it must be remarked that it is misleading
to compare the latter view with atheism and agnosticism. These two views on religions
can be compared to each other and to agnosticism, as they all presuppose that
the above mentioned sentences, which their adherents would put forward, have a semantic
meaning and do not just borrow an appearance of semantic meaning from real
words. However, in its best wording ignosticism is just a result of the quite elementary truth that all sentences must have a
clarified meaning in order that they can be discussed.
Firstly, however, the quotation simply turns the case
upside down. It is not the persons who can argue for the semantic senselessness
of the religions that are ignorant; for it is the religious persons that must
be able to explain their own putative concepts, before they can attribute a
semantic meaning to them. As long as the religious persons cannot do this, it
is them that are ignorant concerning what kind of diffuse ideas they have
themselves. In the above mentioned section “Semantic critique of religious
sequences of signs”, this has been gone through and justified in a number of respects,
and with increasing goodwill.
We are here dealing with the same kind of misuse
of the word “ignorant” as calling a person ignorant if he does not know where
his neighbour keeps his tool box.
According to the second definition of the lexicon
article, ignosticism is synonymous to theological
noncognitivism.
Theological noncognitivism.
This ism is defined in this way:
’Theological
noncognitivism is the argument that religious
language, and specifically words like God, are not cognitively meaningful. It is sometimes considered to be
synonymous with ignosticism. ([Theological
noncognitivism])
However, this statement is too week, as the
concept of cognitive meaningfulness only demands that what is discussed has to
be decidable, either analytically or empirically. However, as religious
sentences are not semantically
meaningful, they do not even qualify to being an object of an analytical or
empirical examination.
The lexicon article concludes:
“As with ignosticism,
the consistent theological noncognitivist awaits
a coherent definition of the word God (or of any other metaphysical utterance
purported to be discussable) before being able to engage in arguments for or
against God's existence. ([Theological noncognitivism], my use
of bold types.)
Certainly, we can only express ourselves about
sentences that only use words that have semantic meaning, such that they are in
fact statements. However, it is misleading to call this fact being waiting. We are just dealing with the
elementary demand that every sentence must have a clarified meaning in order to
be a statement we can take a position on.
Moreover, the quoted passage is semantically
senseless itself, as it contains the unclarified sign sequence “God’s
existence”. The wording suggest intriguingly that it is given that this sign
sequence can be attributed a meaning we just wait for. The quotation contains
the same error as the sentence “Before it can be decided whether Kryxir exists
it must be decided what ‘Kryxir’ denotes”. This sentence suggests that, it is
given that “Kryxir” denotes something we have just not clarified yet. Certainly
we can refer to sign sequences whose meaning we do not know, but we do not use
them as words. Instead we can say “Some people asserts that there is something
they call “Kryxir”. Before we can relate to that, they must explain what they
talk about”.
Both those who assert “God exists” and those that
assert “Kryxir exists” may simply be expected to have an explanation ready,
i.e. to know what they say themselves. The fact that they cannot do this is not
an attribute of those who points it out.
Litteratur:
[Treatise No 5]: https://antiintroduktionisme.wordpress.com/2015/09/23/anti-introduktionisme-afhandling-nr-5/
or in http://sites.google.com/site/antiintroductionism.
[Etymology]: http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ignosticism.
[Ignosticism]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ignosticism.
[Skepticisme]: http://www.skepticisme.dk/2008/12/hvis-man-ikke-er-teist-s-er-man-ateist.html.
[Theological
noncognitivism]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theological_noncognitivism
Saturday, 22 September 2012
Presuppositions in religion and the realism debate.
The well-known teasing question, “Do you still beat your wife” presupposes the truth of at least two suppositions (i.e. implies their truth for different semantic reasons): that the respondent has a wife, and that he has beaten her. If this is not the case, the respondent can answer neither in the affirmative nor in the negative without admitting what is presupposed. Instead, he has to answer e.g., “In fact, I have never beaten my wife”.
This popular example comes under H. P. Grice’s considerations about communication in his article “Logic and conversation”. One of Grice’s results is that the successful communication comprises exactly what is necessary to communicate the message aimed at.
However, there is one particular, overriding, condition which every statement presupposes viz. that the statement has semantic meaning, especially that the singular words have word meaning. Next, it presupposes that the interlocutor can accept the contained concepts. The similar of course applies to questions, mutatis mutandis.
It must also be observed that when a sentence can be declared semantically meaningless, it does not qualify to be disproved, neither empirically nor rationally. For it has no semantic content.
Among the examples of sign sequences that may have semantic meaning but which some do not want to accept for specific reasons, can be the Danish term “starthjælp” (“start help”) or metaphorical use of the term “arbiter of taste”. Their reason may be that the former is used as a kind of new speech about reduced social benefits and the latter about persons who have studied a field.
It must be observed that to explain what something, i.e. some X or other, is, it is insufficient just to say “X is something that has these and these qualities” or “X is that which is so and so”, unless the defining relative clause refers to the concept that should be the starting point of the definition. However, this would make the sentence unnecessarily clumsy. (It would e.g. be clumsy to say, “A table is something that is a piece of furniture that...”) Instead, we must use the schema “X is a Y that has these and these qualities”. We could e.g. say “A table is a piece of furniture that...” or “A table is a physical object that...” Thus, we can only define something by means of already clarified concepts.
Religion.
A sad example of this is made by the question “Do you believe in God?” which presupposes that it consists of words, especially that the sign sequences “believe” and “God” are words. The section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs” in Treatise No 5 it makes good that this is not the case at all, but that these sign sequences only borrow an appearance of semantic meaning form usages in which they in fact have semantic meaning and thus are words. Therefore, we can answer this question neither in the affirmative nor in the negative without accepting that the two mentioned sign sequences “believe” and “God” have semantic meaning. Likewise, the concepts theist, agnostic and atheist all presuppose too much, if we for instance define a theist as a person that asserts, “I believe in God”. Thus, we cannot either answer the question “Are you an atheist?” without accepting the religious persons’ putative concepts. Instead, we can only say that the atheists have not understood the religious persons’ error, and explain this as it has been done in the treatise referred to above.
From the arguments above in can be concluded that when A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic advances a stringent rational proof against the existence of a putative God, this is superflouos. For there is neither something to prove nor disprove. Certainly, Ayer also concludes that the theists are not sufficiently critical. However, his reasons are that they accept statements such as ‘There is no transcendent god’, which are “nonsensical”, because they are metaphysical and thus neither true nor false. Thus, it must be observed that when Ayer says that “the term ’God’” is a metaphysical term, he erroneously attributes a semantic meaning to the sign sequence “God”. However, as above-mentioned, even this lacking word meaning makes the religious sentences semantically meaningless.
The realism debate.
In his treatise Reality Lost and Found” Søren Harnow Klausen asserts: “Since antirealism is the denial of realism, the definition of this term becomes absolutely crucial”. ([Klausen 04] p. 13)
However, the premiss about anti-realism presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the concepts that enter into this definition, which does not have to be the case at all. It is just as wrong to assert that anti-realism is the opposite of realism as it is to assert that atheism is the opposite of theism – for similar reasons. SHK presents the following definition of realism:
“Realism about the external world is the view that the world exists...”, and that its basic qualities are independent of how they are experienced and understood by conscious beings. ([Klausen 04] p. 13-14)
However, SHK does not thematize what it means to say that the world exists. Instead, SHK copies what he wants to negate into his definition of anti-realism, which is exactly what one cannot do if one wants to do full justice to the realism debate:
“Anti-realism is any denial of – or refusal to subscribe to - the view that the word exits...” with the same additions as referred above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)
However, the anti-realist does not at all need to deny that the world exists, or that the attributes of the world depend of how it is experienced. For of course an anti-realist can think that reality exists but just have a different interpretation of the statement “Reality exists” than the realist has, so far as the latter has an interpretation. Thus, the anti-realist may think that the realism debate is about the semantic meaning of this statement, including what it means that things exist and have the qualities they have.
It is also expressive of a simplified idea of the substance of the realism debate if the expression “the denial” is supposed to denote the directly contrary viewpoint. For then it presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the realist’s view of the problem as being about existence versus not-existence. If, however, the expression is just to denote some contradiction it becomes too loose and not a definition of anti-realism, but just some view or other that accepts the realist’s way of presenting the problem.
For safety’s sake, Klausen amplifies his mistake with this statement:
“Realism is of course the belief in the existence of reality”. ([Klausen 04] p. 14, my bold types.)
However, as already made clear, the realism debate does not deal with existence versus not-existence, but with the semantic meaning of our existence statements. And it does not at all deal with any forms of belief or suppositions, but with arguments. This naturally turns the attention to the fact that SHK’s lacking understanding of this is already suggested by the title of SHK’s book Reality Lost and Found, which suggests that reality does not exist according to the one part of the realism debate, but exist according to the other part.
SHK defines reality and the world in the following remarkable way: ‘And reality is simply “the world” as defined above”: that which exists independently of its being experienced...’ with the most of the additions above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)
What is remarkable in this quotation is its use of the following concept:
“that which exists independently of its being experienced...”.
This definition reminds incredibly much of past definitions of some entity X called “God”, e.g. that which is the greatest”. Both definitions presuppose that it has been clarified what kind of “that” we are dealing with.
Firstly, the definition circularly presupposes that it has sense to discuss the subject in this way, which is exactly what the realism is about and which some anti-realists want to argue against. Secondly, it presupposes that the opponent can accept it. As it has been concluded, definitions demand clarified concepts. Klausen’s erroneous approach has been touched on in the section “The semantic approach the realism debate” in Treatise No 4.
Litteratur:
Treatises No 1-7: http://philosophical-debate.blogspot.dk/ eller http://sites.google.com/site/antiintroduktionisme.
Søren Harnow Klausen: Reality Lost and Found, University Press of Southern Denmark, (Denmark 2004).
This popular example comes under H. P. Grice’s considerations about communication in his article “Logic and conversation”. One of Grice’s results is that the successful communication comprises exactly what is necessary to communicate the message aimed at.
However, there is one particular, overriding, condition which every statement presupposes viz. that the statement has semantic meaning, especially that the singular words have word meaning. Next, it presupposes that the interlocutor can accept the contained concepts. The similar of course applies to questions, mutatis mutandis.
It must also be observed that when a sentence can be declared semantically meaningless, it does not qualify to be disproved, neither empirically nor rationally. For it has no semantic content.
Among the examples of sign sequences that may have semantic meaning but which some do not want to accept for specific reasons, can be the Danish term “starthjælp” (“start help”) or metaphorical use of the term “arbiter of taste”. Their reason may be that the former is used as a kind of new speech about reduced social benefits and the latter about persons who have studied a field.
It must be observed that to explain what something, i.e. some X or other, is, it is insufficient just to say “X is something that has these and these qualities” or “X is that which is so and so”, unless the defining relative clause refers to the concept that should be the starting point of the definition. However, this would make the sentence unnecessarily clumsy. (It would e.g. be clumsy to say, “A table is something that is a piece of furniture that...”) Instead, we must use the schema “X is a Y that has these and these qualities”. We could e.g. say “A table is a piece of furniture that...” or “A table is a physical object that...” Thus, we can only define something by means of already clarified concepts.
Religion.
A sad example of this is made by the question “Do you believe in God?” which presupposes that it consists of words, especially that the sign sequences “believe” and “God” are words. The section “Semantic critique of religious sequences of signs” in Treatise No 5 it makes good that this is not the case at all, but that these sign sequences only borrow an appearance of semantic meaning form usages in which they in fact have semantic meaning and thus are words. Therefore, we can answer this question neither in the affirmative nor in the negative without accepting that the two mentioned sign sequences “believe” and “God” have semantic meaning. Likewise, the concepts theist, agnostic and atheist all presuppose too much, if we for instance define a theist as a person that asserts, “I believe in God”. Thus, we cannot either answer the question “Are you an atheist?” without accepting the religious persons’ putative concepts. Instead, we can only say that the atheists have not understood the religious persons’ error, and explain this as it has been done in the treatise referred to above.
From the arguments above in can be concluded that when A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic advances a stringent rational proof against the existence of a putative God, this is superflouos. For there is neither something to prove nor disprove. Certainly, Ayer also concludes that the theists are not sufficiently critical. However, his reasons are that they accept statements such as ‘There is no transcendent god’, which are “nonsensical”, because they are metaphysical and thus neither true nor false. Thus, it must be observed that when Ayer says that “the term ’God’” is a metaphysical term, he erroneously attributes a semantic meaning to the sign sequence “God”. However, as above-mentioned, even this lacking word meaning makes the religious sentences semantically meaningless.
The realism debate.
In his treatise Reality Lost and Found” Søren Harnow Klausen asserts: “Since antirealism is the denial of realism, the definition of this term becomes absolutely crucial”. ([Klausen 04] p. 13)
However, the premiss about anti-realism presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the concepts that enter into this definition, which does not have to be the case at all. It is just as wrong to assert that anti-realism is the opposite of realism as it is to assert that atheism is the opposite of theism – for similar reasons. SHK presents the following definition of realism:
“Realism about the external world is the view that the world exists...”, and that its basic qualities are independent of how they are experienced and understood by conscious beings. ([Klausen 04] p. 13-14)
However, SHK does not thematize what it means to say that the world exists. Instead, SHK copies what he wants to negate into his definition of anti-realism, which is exactly what one cannot do if one wants to do full justice to the realism debate:
“Anti-realism is any denial of – or refusal to subscribe to - the view that the word exits...” with the same additions as referred above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)
However, the anti-realist does not at all need to deny that the world exists, or that the attributes of the world depend of how it is experienced. For of course an anti-realist can think that reality exists but just have a different interpretation of the statement “Reality exists” than the realist has, so far as the latter has an interpretation. Thus, the anti-realist may think that the realism debate is about the semantic meaning of this statement, including what it means that things exist and have the qualities they have.
It is also expressive of a simplified idea of the substance of the realism debate if the expression “the denial” is supposed to denote the directly contrary viewpoint. For then it presupposes that the anti-realist can accept the realist’s view of the problem as being about existence versus not-existence. If, however, the expression is just to denote some contradiction it becomes too loose and not a definition of anti-realism, but just some view or other that accepts the realist’s way of presenting the problem.
For safety’s sake, Klausen amplifies his mistake with this statement:
“Realism is of course the belief in the existence of reality”. ([Klausen 04] p. 14, my bold types.)
However, as already made clear, the realism debate does not deal with existence versus not-existence, but with the semantic meaning of our existence statements. And it does not at all deal with any forms of belief or suppositions, but with arguments. This naturally turns the attention to the fact that SHK’s lacking understanding of this is already suggested by the title of SHK’s book Reality Lost and Found, which suggests that reality does not exist according to the one part of the realism debate, but exist according to the other part.
SHK defines reality and the world in the following remarkable way: ‘And reality is simply “the world” as defined above”: that which exists independently of its being experienced...’ with the most of the additions above. ([Klausen 04] p. 14)
What is remarkable in this quotation is its use of the following concept:
“that which exists independently of its being experienced...”.
This definition reminds incredibly much of past definitions of some entity X called “God”, e.g. that which is the greatest”. Both definitions presuppose that it has been clarified what kind of “that” we are dealing with.
Firstly, the definition circularly presupposes that it has sense to discuss the subject in this way, which is exactly what the realism is about and which some anti-realists want to argue against. Secondly, it presupposes that the opponent can accept it. As it has been concluded, definitions demand clarified concepts. Klausen’s erroneous approach has been touched on in the section “The semantic approach the realism debate” in Treatise No 4.
Litteratur:
Treatises No 1-7: http://philosophical-debate.blogspot.dk/ eller http://sites.google.com/site/antiintroduktionisme.
A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin Books Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).
H. P. Grice: “Logic and Conversation”, i Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language, Robert M. Harnish (ed.), (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1994).Søren Harnow Klausen: Reality Lost and Found, University Press of Southern Denmark, (Denmark 2004).
Friday, 14 September 2012
An ethical basis.
Is there a basis of ethics and politics, i.e. one or more objectively substantiated statements about how it is best to act?
The question has already been clarified in Treatise No 6, which also advances some examples of the consequences for politics.
The discussion started from the point of view Alfred Ayer states in Language, Truth and Logic ([Ayer 74], pp. 136-150), that the only thing we can argue for concerning moral is the facts that sustain our moral conclusions given a particular moral attitude, whereas we cannot argue for the very moral attitude concerned. ([Ayer 74], p. 147) As far as I can see, Ayer oddly enough does not substantiate his own view.
As the next best solution, we can alternatively imagine that a basis follows from a particular statement, which it would be unreasonable not to accept. However, luckily we do not have to leave it at that.
As regards the necessary basis, we can make the following considerations.
The principle of argumentation.
After the fashion of Aristotle’s principle of contradiction, we can talk of a “principle of argumentation”. The principle is rather evident and sounds:
It is necessary to argue for one’s statements in order that they can be standpoints.
It is possible to choose not to discuss one’s standpoints. Those who have that attitude can just insistently assert, “I chose to think whatever that suits me to think”. However in that case and in the nature of the case, we only have to do with an unfounded standpoint. This is at most a sociological problem, not a philosophical one.
We can argue against this standpoint, in so far as it can be called a standpoint, that an unfounded standpoint is just arbitrary, and that it follows from the standpoint that any standpoint can be just as good or bad as any other, and that the standpoint leads to a situation in which arbitrary standpoints are faced with each other. However, this is of no use towards to the person who advances it. We can only convince the holder by getting him argue for his standpoint. (For then, the standpoint is not just a choice, but a standpoint the holder thinks is right.) Cf. [Aristoteles 1968] 1006a.
This argument can be compared to Aristotle’s argumentation for the principle of contradiction: that we cannot argue against the person who denies it, because it presupposes what is to be proved. We can only convince him by getting him follow the principle.
The derivation of a basis of ethics.
Instead, if a person at all wants to discuss the question whether there is a basis of an ethic and politics, he must admit that there is such a basis, and even which basis it proves to be. This has the following reason:
If we want to discuss the question and search for an answer to it, we must concentrate on it and seek to clarify all the circumstances that can illuminate it. This demands favourable life conditions for those who will endeavour to make the necessary investigations and considerations. With this, we have succeeded in finding the basis of an ethics and a politics: the consideration for and a demand for good life conditions for everybody. This has concrete implications concerning how the society ought to be in order to fulfil this demand, and concerning how we ought to act.
Of course, each person’s individual situation and surroundings ought to be involved in his evaluation of his acts. Thus, the individual must concentrate on a number of different circumstances. For ethical questions must be decided on the basis of an understanding of the case itself, and what it involves. This means that any kind of command ethics must be rejected. (Of course, this has nothing to do with traffic rules or the like.)
It can be objected to this argument that it is very far-fetched to argue that there are objective arguments concerning how we ought to act and to arrange society, arguments that are based on the conditions for the very discussion of whether there is an objective ethical basis.
To this, it can be answered that all investigations and clarifications demand good conditions of life. This applies for instance to the existential question of whether life has meaning. It applies to philosophy, linguistics, and all education, both to receive it and to give it. However, this is just an example of an appealing argument for the existence of a basis of ethics.
The question is whether this argument is sufficient to point out a basis of ethics. It would of course be fine if it were so, so it is not to belittle this argument that the following must be considered. However, we must be quite sure. For this reason, the two answers must be compared:
If we presuppose that a question of existential character is to be answered, this certainly involves that the question must be investigated into and that this demands good life conditions. However, there exists no necessary demand that the question must be answered. Thus, the moral basis does not follow with necessity, but only as a side issue of this precondition.
However, if we presuppose that we have to answer the very question whether there is a basis of ethics, then it is a necessary demand that the question of the basis of an ethics must be answered, just because it is put forward. Therefore, the moral basis follows of necessity.
The answer is neither farfetched nor technical as it is a part of one’s ethical considerations to consider whether the ethic is based on a necessary basis, and thus whether one’s acts and chosen politics are based on a necessary basis. Above it has been made good that willingness to clarifying existential questions has ethical implications, however the willingness to this is not in itself necessary. Contrary to this, ethical investigations also involves existential investigations, these have certainly ethical consequences, however they already follows of the willingness to make the ethical investigations.
How broad this basis is, i.e. which types of acts it has clear implications, however, is not immediately clear.
Consequences.
From this basis, it follows that acts that reduce other persons’ living conditions are objectionable. With that, it is objectionable if the laws of a country force the citizens in certain social groups to use all their energy on managing a hand-to-mouth existence, so that they get no means to clarification and experience, i.e. means to live the life and to know it.
In Treatise No 6 further consequences are stated. A few of these are mentioned here:
Any striving towards superfluous products can of course only take place at the expense of other persons’ possibilities of obtaining a reasonable basis of a good life, i.e. their good life conditions. Thus, this striving is objectionable, or rather, not in accordance with the above conclusion. Of course, the same applies to inveigling other people into the same striving.
Superfluous production, and exhaustion of the soil are likewise objectionable as its spoils the basis of our existence, clarification and understanding. The decisive point is here, that though most persons may assert that this is obvious, it is also necessarily true according to the arguments above. Moreover, superfluous production takes up a substantial part of our time for clarification and other forms of experience. The same criticism can be levelled against the very interest in superfluous products.
Some will advance that everyone has the right to dispose of himself and of what he produces and earn. However, above it has been substantiated that this must not be done at the expense of other persons’ possibility of having good life conditions. It must be sufficient to have enough to manage one’s own living conditions and possibilities of development.
It must be observed that we cannot sell out of this basis, understood such that reducing persons’ favourable life conditions can be justified with the argument that they will benefit from this later in some future fiction. We live here and now and need good life conditions here and now. All what we do must always be related not only to the consideration of all persons good life conditions, but also to the reason to this consideration.
Literature.
[Aristotle 68] Aristotle: The Metaphysics, English translation by High Tredennick, Harvard Univ. Press, William Heinemann Ltd. (Great Britain 1968).
[Ayer 74] A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic Penguin Books Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).
The question has already been clarified in Treatise No 6, which also advances some examples of the consequences for politics.
The discussion started from the point of view Alfred Ayer states in Language, Truth and Logic ([Ayer 74], pp. 136-150), that the only thing we can argue for concerning moral is the facts that sustain our moral conclusions given a particular moral attitude, whereas we cannot argue for the very moral attitude concerned. ([Ayer 74], p. 147) As far as I can see, Ayer oddly enough does not substantiate his own view.
As the next best solution, we can alternatively imagine that a basis follows from a particular statement, which it would be unreasonable not to accept. However, luckily we do not have to leave it at that.
As regards the necessary basis, we can make the following considerations.
The principle of argumentation.
After the fashion of Aristotle’s principle of contradiction, we can talk of a “principle of argumentation”. The principle is rather evident and sounds:
It is necessary to argue for one’s statements in order that they can be standpoints.
It is possible to choose not to discuss one’s standpoints. Those who have that attitude can just insistently assert, “I chose to think whatever that suits me to think”. However in that case and in the nature of the case, we only have to do with an unfounded standpoint. This is at most a sociological problem, not a philosophical one.
We can argue against this standpoint, in so far as it can be called a standpoint, that an unfounded standpoint is just arbitrary, and that it follows from the standpoint that any standpoint can be just as good or bad as any other, and that the standpoint leads to a situation in which arbitrary standpoints are faced with each other. However, this is of no use towards to the person who advances it. We can only convince the holder by getting him argue for his standpoint. (For then, the standpoint is not just a choice, but a standpoint the holder thinks is right.) Cf. [Aristoteles 1968] 1006a.
This argument can be compared to Aristotle’s argumentation for the principle of contradiction: that we cannot argue against the person who denies it, because it presupposes what is to be proved. We can only convince him by getting him follow the principle.
The derivation of a basis of ethics.
Instead, if a person at all wants to discuss the question whether there is a basis of an ethic and politics, he must admit that there is such a basis, and even which basis it proves to be. This has the following reason:
If we want to discuss the question and search for an answer to it, we must concentrate on it and seek to clarify all the circumstances that can illuminate it. This demands favourable life conditions for those who will endeavour to make the necessary investigations and considerations. With this, we have succeeded in finding the basis of an ethics and a politics: the consideration for and a demand for good life conditions for everybody. This has concrete implications concerning how the society ought to be in order to fulfil this demand, and concerning how we ought to act.
Of course, each person’s individual situation and surroundings ought to be involved in his evaluation of his acts. Thus, the individual must concentrate on a number of different circumstances. For ethical questions must be decided on the basis of an understanding of the case itself, and what it involves. This means that any kind of command ethics must be rejected. (Of course, this has nothing to do with traffic rules or the like.)
It can be objected to this argument that it is very far-fetched to argue that there are objective arguments concerning how we ought to act and to arrange society, arguments that are based on the conditions for the very discussion of whether there is an objective ethical basis.
To this, it can be answered that all investigations and clarifications demand good conditions of life. This applies for instance to the existential question of whether life has meaning. It applies to philosophy, linguistics, and all education, both to receive it and to give it. However, this is just an example of an appealing argument for the existence of a basis of ethics.
The question is whether this argument is sufficient to point out a basis of ethics. It would of course be fine if it were so, so it is not to belittle this argument that the following must be considered. However, we must be quite sure. For this reason, the two answers must be compared:
If we presuppose that a question of existential character is to be answered, this certainly involves that the question must be investigated into and that this demands good life conditions. However, there exists no necessary demand that the question must be answered. Thus, the moral basis does not follow with necessity, but only as a side issue of this precondition.
However, if we presuppose that we have to answer the very question whether there is a basis of ethics, then it is a necessary demand that the question of the basis of an ethics must be answered, just because it is put forward. Therefore, the moral basis follows of necessity.
The answer is neither farfetched nor technical as it is a part of one’s ethical considerations to consider whether the ethic is based on a necessary basis, and thus whether one’s acts and chosen politics are based on a necessary basis. Above it has been made good that willingness to clarifying existential questions has ethical implications, however the willingness to this is not in itself necessary. Contrary to this, ethical investigations also involves existential investigations, these have certainly ethical consequences, however they already follows of the willingness to make the ethical investigations.
How broad this basis is, i.e. which types of acts it has clear implications, however, is not immediately clear.
Consequences.
From this basis, it follows that acts that reduce other persons’ living conditions are objectionable. With that, it is objectionable if the laws of a country force the citizens in certain social groups to use all their energy on managing a hand-to-mouth existence, so that they get no means to clarification and experience, i.e. means to live the life and to know it.
In Treatise No 6 further consequences are stated. A few of these are mentioned here:
Any striving towards superfluous products can of course only take place at the expense of other persons’ possibilities of obtaining a reasonable basis of a good life, i.e. their good life conditions. Thus, this striving is objectionable, or rather, not in accordance with the above conclusion. Of course, the same applies to inveigling other people into the same striving.
Superfluous production, and exhaustion of the soil are likewise objectionable as its spoils the basis of our existence, clarification and understanding. The decisive point is here, that though most persons may assert that this is obvious, it is also necessarily true according to the arguments above. Moreover, superfluous production takes up a substantial part of our time for clarification and other forms of experience. The same criticism can be levelled against the very interest in superfluous products.
Some will advance that everyone has the right to dispose of himself and of what he produces and earn. However, above it has been substantiated that this must not be done at the expense of other persons’ possibility of having good life conditions. It must be sufficient to have enough to manage one’s own living conditions and possibilities of development.
It must be observed that we cannot sell out of this basis, understood such that reducing persons’ favourable life conditions can be justified with the argument that they will benefit from this later in some future fiction. We live here and now and need good life conditions here and now. All what we do must always be related not only to the consideration of all persons good life conditions, but also to the reason to this consideration.
Literature.
[Aristotle 68] Aristotle: The Metaphysics, English translation by High Tredennick, Harvard Univ. Press, William Heinemann Ltd. (Great Britain 1968).
[Ayer 74] A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic Penguin Books Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).
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