Tuesday, 20 October 2015

Links to further of my English home pages.

Ethical criticism of in fact occurring acts and attitudes.
Criticism is welcome.
http://practical-ethics.blogspot.dk/
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Treatises. My philosophical Treatises No 1-8 concerning anti-introductionism.
https://wordpress.com/posts/antiintroductionism.wordpress.com
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Treatises Here they are also available in a Word version.
https://sites.google.com/site/antiintroductionism/
. My philosophical Treatises No 1-8 concerning anti-introductionism.

Friday, 9 October 2015

Zeno’s paradoxes about movement, a short version.

23/10 2015

Zeno’s so-called paradoxes about movement we know from Aristotle’s rendition: 

The paradox about Achilles and the tortoise is the paradox Aristotle calls “the so-called ‘Achilles’”:
”In a race the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold a lead.” (239b14) ([Kirk 83], p. 272)

The dichotomy paradox.
This treatise uses the designation, “Zeno’s dichotomy account” several times. This account enters as a part of the dichotomy paradox:
“... The first [paradox] asserts the non-existence of motion on the ground that that which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal...” (239b11) ([Kirk 83], p. 270, my square bracket.)
Zeno’s dichotomy account is simply the latter statement:
”that which is in locomotion must arrive at the half-way stage before it arrives at the goal” (239b11) ([Kirk 83], p. 270)

Introduction.

These paradoxes have been discussed ever since they were first put forward. One may ask himself, or at least someone will ask why they have been that really, as we manage splendidly without thinking about them. To this, it may be said that if a person thinks that it is unworthy to let questions lie without seeking to understand and answer them, he will have to attempt to make a contribution to this. Moreover, if one does not in advance know whether these efforts will lead to a profitable result it is extra unwise to leave them undone.
Here they are scrutinized and interpreted.

General remarks about interpretation and criticism.

When criticising a statement and interpreting it not only necessary, but also profitable to avoid the serious argumentation error that consists in “The easily refutable interpretation explained”. This is explained here:

The easily refutable interpretation consists in not choosing the most difficultly refutable interpretation of a statement one wants to refute:
When criticizing an argument, in the interest of the truth, we ought not to choose the most easily refutable interpretation thereof it, but the most difficultly refutable. For when the most easily refutable interpretation has been refuted, the most difficultly refutable interpretation has still not been refuted.
A more difficultly refutable interpretation can be gained by removing criticisable subordinate details of the text. This idea of concentrating on the matter itself leads to the most fruitful interpretation in the easiest way. For by this, we can concentrate on the matter itself and avoid futile speculations about what the author might have thought.
Thus, it is not profitable to refute the above-mentioned paradoxes by reference to ideas of a least measurable distance or ideas about undividable particles or points or something similar. The final version we will have to look at thus becomes an account that takes place in a mathematical universe added a parameter we can call “time”
The understanding and the interpretation of Zeno’s two accounts deals with both their mathematical content and the interpretation of them. On the one side, it is not sufficient to understand them as mathematical or physical statements. On the other side, their mathematical and logical content must be included in the interpreting of them.

The mathematical content.

As to the mathematical and logical considerations, we can focus on the dichotomy paragraph, as this corresponds to Achilleus run relatively to the position of the tortoise.
As there is no absolute distances on a line in geometry, no change has happened concerning the situation of the object on the line after each traversing of the first half of the rest. This can be illustrated with these two graphs:

 0------------------------------1/2-------------3/4-----7/8------1

1/2-----------------------------3/4-------------7/8----15/16-----1

Therefore, task remains completely the same after each passage of a partial stretch. Thus, the moving object in Zeno’s analysis remain to the left of the goal, i.e. the open interval from and including the starting point t0 unto t0 + 1/v, where v is the velocity of the moving object. The division of the remaining part of the line is even isomorph to division of the line before the last passage.
As Aristotle suggests, a similar division of the time into time intervals can be made, wherefore there is time enough to traverse all the intervals in the stretch. [1] However, all what can be said about the stretch can be said about the whole time interval, just about times instead of partial stretches. Thus, time courses are just as paradoxical as passing stretches.
A number of mathematicians have got the idea that of summing up all the partial stretches (½)1, (½)2, (½)3,... The intention of the mathematicians in question is obviously to prove that at the sum of all these distances is equal to the whole distance, and that the traverse of them thus lead to the goal.
Let Sn denote ni=0(½)i, and let S denote the limit value of Sn for n going towards , i.e. for n increasing unlimited. This expression does thus not denote a summation of infinitely many numbers in any literal way.
In general a function f(x) is said to go towards the limit value b for x going to wards , if
"εÎR+: $hÎN: "x: x > h => 0 < |f(x) - b| ≤ ε.
This definition can be applied at Sn, which means that the following must be proved:
"εÎR+: $hÎN: "n: n > h => 0 < |Sn - S| ≤ ε, where Sn can be substituted by the above definition, and S with a proposal for a limit value, e.g. the value 1, where after the correctness of this can be verified.
This mathematical formalism however does not solve the paradox, as it, as just mentioned, does not deal with any, but about a limit value, which is something else, for the above definition just means this:
A limit of a sum of n numbers for n going towards infinity is not a sum of infinitely many numbers in some literal sense, but is a value to which this sum of n numbers can get arbitrarily close without coming farther away for any number higher than n.
Thus, the above proof does not contradict Zeno’s paradox, but rather copies it. In both the proof and the paradox, we are dealing with something that comes arbitrarily close to a certain entity, but without reaching it, namely respectively what is converged towards and the goal.
There is nothing paradoxical in this. The same applies to other function, for example the function f(x): 1 – 1/x.

The interpretation.
The interpretation is important and necessary, for just as all statements is supposed to have semantic meaning, they ae also presupposed to have a content in the form of a message.
It can be objected, quite true, that the dichotomy account is simply told in such a way that it does not get to an end. However, it is exactly the message of the account that it is possible to describe the run in this way. For this account aims at showing that we can come closer and closer to a definite future moment without reaching it, just as an object can come still closer to a point at a line without reaching it.
It can also be objected that according to common sense and our structured experiences, we can reach a point farer away at a line according to the equation:
s = v * t, where s denotes the length of the traversed stretch of an object, v the velocity of the object, and t the elapsed time.
This is certainly based on memorized experiences about an object at a certain moment having been at a certain place and later having been at another place, i.e. that it has reached this, i.e. the goal. However, the question is how this movement happens.
We cannot describe this passage point after point and neither as partial interval after partial interval. We can only imagine that we have been going from the past and arbitrarily close to the now, but not how the transfer to this happens, as the last part of this transition can be divided just as the whole passage can. Thus, the past is only something we have some diffuse ideas about. However, in the now we are already in the now.

Cf. the links below.

Conclusion.

It has appeared that the function f(n) = ni=0(½)i, which expresses the length of the first n partial stretches, has the limit value 1 for n going towards ∞, but does not assume the value 1 for any n. This very fact is not paradoxical.
It can be objected that in practise this have no sense used on the division of a stretch in partial stretches of the length (½)i. This is not just to choose the most easily refutable interpretation, though, but also to omit an understanding of Zeno’s account. Alternatively, one could just as well assert that the function s(t) = v * t gradually assumes the value 1. However what Zeno analyses is just the gradually gaining any value of this function. The state that s(t) < 1 we can call being in the past. The state that s(t) = 1, we can call being in the now. The transition to this state does not happen to any value of t in the past.

Literature.

 [Kirk 83]         G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, M. Schofield: The Presocratic Philosophers, 2. ed.,
(Cambridge 1983)
Treatise No 8:
”the continuation” Zeno’s runner paardoxes:  http://www.ovemk2.blogspot.dk/2015/06/achilles-and-tortoise.html




[1] Aristoteles advances that distance and time can be called “infinite” both as to divisibility and their utmost end, and concludes from this that the goal can be reached in a finite time:
“So while a thing in a finite time cannot come in contact with things quantitatively infinite, it can come in contact with things infinite in respect of divisibility: for in this sense the time itself is also infinite: and so we find that the time occupied by the passage over the infinite is not a finite but an infinite time, and the contact with the infinites is made by means of moments not finite but infinite in number. (After Gaye)” ([Kirk 83], p. 270, my underlinings.)