Is there a basis of ethics and politics, i.e. one or more objectively substantiated statements about how it is best to act?
The question has already been clarified in Treatise No 6, which also advances some examples of the consequences for politics.
The discussion started from the point of view Alfred Ayer states in Language, Truth and Logic ([Ayer 74], pp. 136-150), that the only thing we can argue for concerning moral is the facts that sustain our moral conclusions given a particular moral attitude, whereas we cannot argue for the very moral attitude concerned. ([Ayer 74], p. 147) As far as I can see, Ayer oddly enough does not substantiate his own view.
As the next best solution, we can alternatively imagine that a basis follows from a particular statement, which it would be unreasonable not to accept. However, luckily we do not have to leave it at that.
As regards the necessary basis, we can make the following considerations.
The principle of argumentation.
After the fashion of Aristotle’s principle of contradiction, we can talk of a “principle of argumentation”. The principle is rather evident and sounds:
It is necessary to argue for one’s statements in order that they can be standpoints.
It is possible to choose not to discuss one’s standpoints. Those who have that attitude can just insistently assert, “I chose to think whatever that suits me to think”. However in that case and in the nature of the case, we only have to do with an unfounded standpoint. This is at most a sociological problem, not a philosophical one.
We can argue against this standpoint, in so far as it can be called a standpoint, that an unfounded standpoint is just arbitrary, and that it follows from the standpoint that any standpoint can be just as good or bad as any other, and that the standpoint leads to a situation in which arbitrary standpoints are faced with each other. However, this is of no use towards to the person who advances it. We can only convince the holder by getting him argue for his standpoint. (For then, the standpoint is not just a choice, but a standpoint the holder thinks is right.) Cf. [Aristoteles 1968] 1006a.
This argument can be compared to Aristotle’s argumentation for the principle of contradiction: that we cannot argue against the person who denies it, because it presupposes what is to be proved. We can only convince him by getting him follow the principle.
The derivation of a basis of ethics.
Instead, if a person at all wants to discuss the question whether there is a basis of an ethic and politics, he must admit that there is such a basis, and even which basis it proves to be. This has the following reason:
If we want to discuss the question and search for an answer to it, we must concentrate on it and seek to clarify all the circumstances that can illuminate it. This demands favourable life conditions for those who will endeavour to make the necessary investigations and considerations. With this, we have succeeded in finding the basis of an ethics and a politics: the consideration for and a demand for good life conditions for everybody. This has concrete implications concerning how the society ought to be in order to fulfil this demand, and concerning how we ought to act.
Of course, each person’s individual situation and surroundings ought to be involved in his evaluation of his acts. Thus, the individual must concentrate on a number of different circumstances. For ethical questions must be decided on the basis of an understanding of the case itself, and what it involves. This means that any kind of command ethics must be rejected. (Of course, this has nothing to do with traffic rules or the like.)
It can be objected to this argument that it is very far-fetched to argue that there are objective arguments concerning how we ought to act and to arrange society, arguments that are based on the conditions for the very discussion of whether there is an objective ethical basis.
To this, it can be answered that all investigations and clarifications demand good conditions of life. This applies for instance to the existential question of whether life has meaning. It applies to philosophy, linguistics, and all education, both to receive it and to give it. However, this is just an example of an appealing argument for the existence of a basis of ethics.
The question is whether this argument is sufficient to point out a basis of ethics. It would of course be fine if it were so, so it is not to belittle this argument that the following must be considered. However, we must be quite sure. For this reason, the two answers must be compared:
If we presuppose that a question of existential character is to be answered, this certainly involves that the question must be investigated into and that this demands good life conditions. However, there exists no necessary demand that the question must be answered. Thus, the moral basis does not follow with necessity, but only as a side issue of this precondition.
However, if we presuppose that we have to answer the very question whether there is a basis of ethics, then it is a necessary demand that the question of the basis of an ethics must be answered, just because it is put forward. Therefore, the moral basis follows of necessity.
The answer is neither farfetched nor technical as it is a part of one’s ethical considerations to consider whether the ethic is based on a necessary basis, and thus whether one’s acts and chosen politics are based on a necessary basis.
Above it has been made good that willingness to clarifying existential questions has ethical implications, however the willingness to this is not in itself necessary. Contrary to this, ethical investigations also involves existential investigations, these have certainly ethical consequences, however they already follows of the willingness to make the ethical investigations.
How broad this basis is, i.e. which types of acts it has clear implications, however, is not immediately clear.
Consequences.
From this basis, it follows that acts that reduce other persons’ living conditions are objectionable. With that, it is objectionable if the laws of a country force the citizens in certain social groups to use all their energy on managing a hand-to-mouth existence, so that they get no means to clarification and experience, i.e. means to live the life and to know it.
In Treatise No 6 further consequences are stated. A few of these are mentioned here:
Any striving towards superfluous products can of course only take place at the expense of other persons’ possibilities of obtaining a reasonable basis of a good life, i.e. their good life conditions. Thus, this striving is objectionable, or rather, not in accordance with the above conclusion. Of course, the same applies to inveigling other people into the same striving.
Superfluous production, and exhaustion of the soil are likewise objectionable as its spoils the basis of our existence, clarification and understanding. The decisive point is here, that though most persons may assert that this is obvious, it is also necessarily true according to the arguments above. Moreover, superfluous production takes up a substantial part of our time for clarification and other forms of experience. The same criticism can be levelled against the very interest in superfluous products.
Some will advance that everyone has the right to dispose of himself and of what he produces and earn. However, above it has been substantiated that this must not be done at the expense of other persons’ possibility of having good life conditions. It must be sufficient to have enough to manage one’s own living conditions and possibilities of development.
It must be observed that we cannot sell out of this basis, understood such that reducing persons’ favourable life conditions can be justified with the argument that they will benefit from this later in some future fiction. We live here and now and need good life conditions here and now. All what we do must always be related not only to the consideration of all persons good life conditions, but also to the reason to this consideration.
Literature.
[Aristotle 68] Aristotle: The Metaphysics,
English translation by High Tredennick,
Harvard Univ. Press, William Heinemann Ltd. (Great Britain 1968).
[Ayer 74] A. J. Ayer: Language, Truth and Logic
Penguin Books Ltd (Harmondsworth, 1974).
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